

## **A War to Sustainable Positive Peace Framework: Implications for Operations, Training, & Leader Development**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

This is a concept paper. Its overall purpose is to discuss the viability and potential of my War to Sustainable Positive Peace analytical framework for better understanding the elements and dynamics of a peace and stability operation environment, and preparing leadership and personnel for related planning, decision making, and engagement. The data shown is real data from my Bosnia in-country field-testing (2009) of the framework. For the purposes of this paper, only samplings of the data are included.

The paper is ordered into four sections as follows:

- **Introduction** – I elaborate on an intervention operational problem that induced me to explore viable concepts for addressing the problem;
- **Negative & Positive Peace Modified for Peace & Stability Operations** – This section describes my logic-of-inquiry and composite framework development process;
- **The Composite Framework Applied** – This section elaborates on my Bosnia in-country field-testing of the resulting concept and framework. It contains seven graphic models that show the development of and flow of analysis for the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Framework, as well as how to use them for operations, or training;
- **Conclusions and Recommendations.**

For readers interested in a larger sampling of actual survey responses and further analysis, I have added Annexes A and B after the Conclusion and Recommendations section, which ends on Page 31.

**Annex A** provides a sampling of actual responses to survey questions by interviewees who have much to convey to students and leaders of interventions; All 30 survey closed-ended questions are given; All 4 open-ended questions are given.

**Annex B** - Contains a sampling of quantified survey responses by five sub-set groups: Bosniak, Bosnian-Serb, Croat, All Bosnian Nationals, and International Intervener. Also the open-ended survey questions and responses are given in Annex B.

For a complete description of the research and data associated with this framework and concept, see my Ph.D. dissertation on file at George Mason University ("*Assessing Interventions Stalled in Negative Peace: A Model for Peace & Stability Operations*").

**International peace and stabilization interventions have evolved into complex multi-sector multi-level enterprises**, which sometimes achieve *Negative Peace* status, in essence, a negotiated political settlement and cessation or suppression of overt hostilities. However, despite intense diplomatic and reconstruction efforts, they often stall or reverse without creating positive peace. In essence, *Positive Peace* (my adapted version) is a condition in which the underlying root causes and conditions, and structural and cultural violence, are being addressed to the extent that local mechanisms for assured continuation of progress are in place and effectively functioning -- and peace enforcement or stabilization assistance by outsiders is no longer needed.

**In the negative peace scenario, conflict party sentiments that precipitated the conflict** requiring the intervention are still in place and remain largely unchanged. And although a negative peace political settlement might be a technically accomplished achievement, it can also be a wholly dysfunctional arrangement that undermines further progress, and has little or nothing to do with reconciliation -- with predictable consequences (see Adams, *Bosnia: Stabilization Stalled in Negative Peace*, Alliance for Peacebuilding, September, 2014; and the WWI - Treaty of Versailles). Put another way, the situation usually involves a deep-rooted intractable conflict stuck in negative peace, or vacillating between war, violent disorder, and negative peace in a protracted conflict cycle.

**Inevitably, such circumstances erupt into renewed war or violent disorder** unless methodically transitioned to a *positive peace* orientation. This is significant since, as of 2013, roughly 90% of all conflicts worldwide were intrastate in nature (see Uppsala Conflict Data), and intrastate conflicts have a very high resurgency rate (31 out of 39 from 2000 to 2010), (Hewitt, et al, 2010). Intrastate conflicts have proven highly resistant to the singular use of force, or to mediation and negotiation diplomacy by nation-states or the United Nations.

**This does not forebode well for stabilization or regional security arrangements.** As demonstrated again and again, something has to give, and sooner or later it will. Fundamentally then, sustainable peace – of the positive kind – is the ultimate challenge, and desired end-state.

**These circumstances, in the context of increasingly complex and chaotic intervention environments**, are what decision makers are facing today in preparing civilian and military leaders and personnel for engaging and collaborating with other , conflict parties, authorities, and local communities in conflict zones.

**It is the problem of interventions stalled in negative peace that induced me to investigate the matter** more methodically. Also, I had been aware for some time, in the field, of distinct and often opposing perceptions by Track 1 and Tracks 2 – 9 actors as to what constitutes conflict transformation. In other words, there is an important difference of opinion as to what constitutes peace and peacebuilding, and a subsequent mission-accomplished status. Consequently, I chose conflict transformation as my primary conceptual means by which to probe for structural and relational indicators and negative and positive peace parameters (**See Conflict Transformation Intervention Perspectives on Page 4**).

**Related to this idea, structural “minimalist” (typically Track 1) and human relational “maximalist” (typically Track 2) approaches** are pursued simultaneously and, usually, independently of each other. Although there is some overlap of opinion on the part of Track 1 and Track 2 actors, the preponderance of implementation policy and funding weight goes to the structural side. The matter of a structural versus a relational approach to stabilization and peacebuilding has significant implications for intervention scenarios and outcomes.


**To be clear on this point, I believe that both negative and positive peace and structural and relational measures of conflict transformation are needed** – sometimes sequentially, sometimes simultaneously. The idea is to get the balance and timing right for particular circumstances. In effect, the application of appropriate measures when and where possible.

**Fundamentally, the research leading to this composite assessment framework** was a qualitatively driven exercise with a quantified kick-start (primary source survey) to start an exploration into relatively unknown conceptual territory. There was not a pre-existing methodology for assessing interventions and environments in structural and relational and negative and positive peace terms, and so much of the work underpinning the concept was to create a methodological path to address the problem. An exploratory abduction-based approach was chosen as the primary mechanism to proceed.

**So, based on my years of experience as a professional field officer** in peace and stability operations, and my recent PhD conceptual work on the subject, I worked out an evidence-based graphically visualized composite framework, with associated models (field tested in Bosnia), to discern structural and relational elements of conflict transformation. The associated models visually guide planners and decision makers through an intervention assessment and approach selection process based on situational factors and desired outcomes. They manageably deconstruct and track key elements and dynamics for multi-level multi-sector collaboration, policy discussions, and briefings. Operationally, the intent is to efficiently guide policy and operational efforts towards more informed responses. The composite framework and models readily facilitate strategic planning.

**I have to qualify that the composite framework is a work-in-progress.** Further statistical analysis of the rich database is needed to establish the full potential of the framework and to make further refinements. Never-the-less, internationals and local nationals who have seen it used in Bosnia confirm its capacity for accuracy and utility.

**INTERVENTION PERSPECTIVES - James Adams, 2014**



**Of immediate concern to PSOTEW 2015:** The composite framework and models readily stimulate discussions regarding stability sectors (governance, security, rule of law, economics, social well-being), and accommodate specific thematic inquiries; For example, on mediation, dialogues, reconstruction, stabilization, peacebuilding, development, security, democracy building, transitional justice, structural and cultural violence, conflict party relationships, and of more recent interest, countering violent extremism. The composite framework by nature accommodates analysis of complexity.

**The composite framework and models readily lend themselves to pre-deployment orientation and training.** They can serve formal education purposes on theory and practice. As a matter of course, leader development and capacity is enhanced by understanding the principles involved and utilizing the framework and models.

**Although I designed the composite framework to be an analysis and briefing tool in the hands of a qualified analyst,** the basic framework graphic has proven relatively easy for national and international interviewees (Bosnia case study) to interpret on an intuitive level with only a few minutes of instruction. Bosnian nationals have commented on its helpfulness in presenting a clearer picture of the elements and dynamics of the Bosnian conflict, helping them to better understand and comment on their own situation. This utility has significant implications for inter-ethnic/conflict party dialogue work, and for local and international collaboration.

**Put succinctly, the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Framework and models involve** the assessment of the perceived status of structural and relational elements (defined conflict transformation indicators) within inferred negative and positive peace parameters. Indicators are notionally associated with conflict and peacebuilding thresholds along a War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum. The framework graphically captures key elements and dynamics for situational awareness and planning discussions based on primary quantitative and qualitative data – whether for operational or educational purposes

#### **A note on types of conflict:**

**Post-Cold War interventions involve an increasing number and diversity of intervention actors, and unintended consequences.** To better delineate the significance of this, I distinguish two general types of conflict in the operating environment. I refer to the first type as **Primary Conflict:** *Those conflicts among conflict parties precipitating an international intervention.*

A secondary type of conflict is **Intervention Conflict**, which in-turn can be divided into two sub-types: 1) *Conflicts between and conflict parties*, and 2) *Conflicts among themselves* (in-house conflict) generated in the course of the intervention. All three types become inter-related and highly reactive to each other.

**I believe that intervention conflict is no small factor in frustrating stabilization and peacebuilding efforts** on the ground; draining otherwise productive energy. Factors common to intervention conflicts are conflicting political self-interests, conflicting mandates and policies, conflicting approaches to coordination, training, and peacebuilding, external pressures, cultural differences, conflicting perceptions/paradigms, personal agendas, and basic personality clashes. Although all three types of conflict simultaneously contribute to the overall character of an intervention, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Primary Conflict.

Never-the-less, I emphasize that the Composite Framework facilitates practical collaboration and coordination discussions that can aid unity of effort.

## NEGATIVE & POSITIVE PEACE MODIFIED FOR PEACE & STABILITY OPERATIONS

**Major international peace and stabilization interventions are profound events**, and are more complex than straight forward war by virtue of often being simultaneously engaged in elements of war and peacebuilding to establish security and prepare conditions for sustainable legitimate governance, reconstruction, and development. And, just as there is more than one kind of war, there is more than one kind of peace.

**To elaborate: Bosnia and Herzegovina is not in a “post”-conflict situation, it is in a post-war situation.** The war is over but the conflict continues. The status of Bosnia can best be described as negative peace. Other countries that might fall under the same status include Kosovo, Cyprus, Kashmir, North Korea, Burma, Guatemala, and Zimbabwe.

**In the cases of pre-civil war Syria and Libya**, national authorities held civil disorder and violence in check by internal enforcement of negative peace measures. The former East Germany and earlier Argentina and Chile likewise constitute classic examples of negative peace. The principle distinction here is between internal (state) and external (international intervention) suppression of war or violent civil disorder. Negative peace, in its most virulent form, is simultaneously a state of latent conflict (no visible violence), and war by other means.

**I have found Galtung’s work on negative and positive peace, and structural and cultural violence to be useful** for better understanding real situations in which I have worked, observed, and participated in as a professional field officer. I have found his concepts useful for framing key dynamics and articulating my own observations.

**Even though Galtung, in 1969, had not yet witnessed** the transition of traditional peacekeeping tasks (observation and separation of antagonists) into the much more complex stabilization and multilevel state-building exercises of recent years, his *structural* and *cultural violence* concepts, and *negative peace* and *positive peace* framework are central to placing the problem of stalled intervention environments in proper context for addressing the problem.

**I should note here that a critique of Galtung’s negative and positive peace** as characterized by Alfred Bonisch (1981) is that it can be taken as “utopian,” posited without empirical basis, and “...separated from the relations of production and prosperity (167).” I have since conducted empirically-based field research in Bosnia in notional association with negative and positive peace parameters.

**Since Galtung introduced his seminal concepts of negative and positive peace (1969) and structural and cultural violence (1990, 1996)** the concepts have steadily gained scholarly credence and general use. Barash and Webel (2002) go so far as to structure fully half of their textbook around descriptions and measures of traditional Track 1 approaches such as diplomacy, negotiations, settlements, legal mandates, and peace enforcement actions said to be dedicated instruments to building negative peace - Part III (“Building Negative Peace”). Part IV (“Building Positive Peace”) of their book is devoted to descriptions of positive peace-oriented measures for the promotion of principles such as human rights, ecological and economic well-being, non-violence, and personal and societal transformation; approaches likely to involve more kinds of Track 2+ actors.

**Although, negative and positive peace have been conceptually associated by scholars with conflict and peacebuilding,** and structural and relational elements have been identified, there had been no methodological attempt that I am aware of to directly link negative and positive peace distinctions to a peace and stability operation environment, and so I started by posing the question: *How can the status of negative and positive peace in a peace and stability intervention environment be assessed?*

**In addressing this question, although I utilize Galtung's concepts of structural and cultural violence intact, I depart from Galtung's original definitions** of negative and positive peace in order to capture complexities specific to a peace and stability operation and environment. Also, I incorporate other directly relevant concepts: Louis Kriesburg's *Constructive Conflict* (2007); the *Drivers of Conflict and Institutional Capacity* (performance) as presented by Grossman-Vermass, Redding, and Wyler at the XIII Cornwallis Conference (2008), and Covy, Dziedzic, and Hawley's *Viable Peace...Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (2005).

**It so happens that while I was working on my recent dissertation on the subject,** a U.S. inter-agency/USIP team was working on *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments* (MPICE) in connection with their *Metrics Framework for Conflict Transformation and Stabilization – Version 1* (2008). The inter-agency team and I were working out a very similar analytical approach for peace and stability operation environment assessment, but independently and unaware of each other's work. When I learned of the inter-agency work, I adopted the 5 basic stability sectors of that framework (governance, security, rule of law, economics, and social welfare -- reducing mine from 20 sectors to 5. It was clear that the inter-agency team had significant field experience and well understood the range of elements that could be assessed having identified 153 elements/indicators. I identified thirty elements/indicators for smaller project manageability.

**My methodology involved interviewing 100 people in Bosnia** (50 Bosnian nationals and 50 internationals) at all levels of organizations and society, accompanied by a 1 to 7 point scaled-survey given in-person during the interviews. The idea was to elicit the perspective of and Bosnian nationals as to the status of 5 key conflict transformation structural elements, and 7 key conflict transformation relational elements in connection with the five stability sectors identified above. Thirty closed-ended questions and four open-ended questions were posed. The basic methodology was exploratory utilizing abduction theory (inference to the best explanation).

**Galtung contends that actual violence and the threat of violence (intimidation) is essentially the same thing.** In either case, a person, group, or society is prevented from fulfilling their rightful potential. Galtung specifies that, "We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as *personal* or *direct*, and to violence where there is no such actor as *structural* or *indirect*." I tend to think of structural/indirect violence as systemic and institutionalized into political, economic, and social structures, -- manifesting as a corporate culture of discrimination, bias, or indifference; for example, in deliberately discriminatory laws based on race or ethnicity (Jim Crow laws, Apartheid).

**Cultural violence is embedded beliefs and values,** often passed on from generation to generation that induces people to innately feel or express prejudice and hostility towards another group. Cultural violence (not visible) underwrites and manifest as personal, direct, and structural violence (Galtung, 1990). I think that it is safe to assume that each type of violence feeds on the other, perpetuating and escalating violence cycles.

**Galtung further posits that structural violence is the uneven distribution** of resources, and the power to decide on the distribution of those resources. He refers to structural violence as “social injustice.” He contends that enforcement authorities, or rights’ commissions, direct their attention to obvious individual perpetrators of direct (visible) violence -- to the symptoms of violent conflict -- but might not fully appreciate the insidious nature of systemic structural violence, for example, legislated discrimination, that is to say, deep-rooted underlying causes and conditions (see Sandole, 2010).

**Galtung links his concepts to other theory and elements**, for example, “peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but equally with development theory...and that conditions in the past, present, and future are intimately connected with conflict research, and development research.” Further linking to other concepts, Galtung refers to “expanding theory of vertical development, of participation, decentralization, co-decision” (1969). These comments directly link negative and positive peace, and measures to mitigate structural and cultural violence, to democracy-building and development, typically tasks of peace and stability operations.

**Galtung argues that unless the interests, causes, and conditions underlying a conflict are effectively addressed**, the conflict will continue to resurface indefinitely. The very high intra-state resurgency rate certainly corroborates that hypothesis. He contends that we must strive to reduce personal violence and eliminate the structural violence (suppression, social injustice, discrimination) supporting it. Presumably, democratization and development contain that intent.

**As alluded to earlier, Galtung (1969), states that “there is lack of fora for the generation of innovative insights** to ensure political, economic, and legal security and recognition of all groups.” He adds: “Typically, there are also insufficient processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues and constructive relationship change.” These two points are important. Whether or not they are intended to apply specifically to peace and stability interventions, they transition his reasoning on negative peace through to positive peace-oriented projects.

**I depart from Galtung’s apparent absolutist’ stance** that the “absence” of structural and cultural violence, presumably the complete elimination of it, is assumed for positive peace. My view is that it is unlikely that all discrimination, injustice, indifference, greed, ignorance, arrogance, insults, revenge, and perhaps misunderstandings and other conflict catalysts, will be eradicated entirely from human affairs in the foreseeable future. That would indeed be utopian, if not the very definition of heaven.

**For the time being, I add a qualifier** that, for a status of positive peace to exist, structural and cultural violence are acknowledged and measures for their control and elimination are institutionalized, active, and effective at all levels, and there are sufficient fora for regional, national, and local civil and governmental dialogues; and assisted stability by outsiders is no longer needed – in effect, a macro application of *constructive conflict* (Kriesburg, 2007), which is based on structural and relationship change fundamentals.



My adapted version of negative and positive peace indicators for peace and stability intervention purposes is as follows:

#### Positive Peace

- The underlying root causes and conditions of conflict are being effectively addressed.
- Structural violence is minimal, and measures are in place for its mitigation and elimination.
- There is a legitimate functioning government and civil system that ensures sufficient political, security, rule-of-law, economic and social welfare, and recognition and identity for all groups.
- There are effective constructive conflict processes for sustained governmental and civil collaborative dialogues.
- Peace enforcement or assisted stability by outsiders is not needed.

#### Negative Peace

- War and/or widespread violence/civil disorder are suppressed by coercion.
- The underlying root causes and conditions of conflict are not being sufficiently addressed.
- Structural and cultural violence is prevalent.
- There is no legitimate functioning government and civil system that ensures sufficient political, security, rule of law, economic and social welfare, and recognition and identity for all groups.
- There are no effective constructive conflict processes for sustained governmental and civil collaborative dialogues.
- Peace enforcement or assisted stability by outsiders is needed.

**Sole attention to negative peace, or the simple absence of war**, usually results in diplomatic emphasis on peacekeeping, or peace enforcement-stabilization. By contrast, positive peace focuses on peacebuilding and the establishment of local non-discriminatory/non-exploitative structures, relationships, and values change.

**Negative peace is a more conservative goal**, as it tends to maintain the status quo, for example, institutional discrimination and territorial gains by war (see Adams, *Bosnia: Stabilization Stalled in Negative Peace*, 2014); whereas, positive peace is more proactive and bolder, implying the creation of something that does not currently exist.

**I believe that the future of conflict, stabilization, and peacebuilding discussion** will necessarily involve structural and relational and negative and positive peace frameworks. The current nation-state protocols for resolving disputes, as established by the 1648 Westphalia Conference, are simply not adequate by themselves to address intra-state conflicts in today's highly interconnected global environment. The protocols assume the nation state as the primary rational actor, often ignoring essential input and participation by indigenous communities, with the exception of the more forceful warlords.

**Specific to this point**, the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Framework provides an intuitive yet evidence-based situational awareness and peacebuilding mechanism that takes into account the perceptions and opinions of individuals and groups at all levels and across all sectors of society. It provides a common language and common analytic picture that, in-turn, facilitates practical collaboration opportunities for , and conflict party members, at national and community levels.

**Finding a practical balance** of necessary negative peace and positive peace measures is now the challenge for civilian and military planners, decision makers, scholar-practitioners, and implementers – whether local or international.

### THE COMPOSITE FRAMEWORK APPLIED (Bosnia Case Study Excerpts)

**Essentially, The Model illustrates the status of key structural and relational elements** of a peace and stabilization operation environment based on a Likert-type 7 point scaled-survey administered in conjunction with scheduled-structured interviews. All 30 survey closed-ended questions are designed to elicit interviewee perceptions as to the status of structural elements or relational elements respectively:

<b><u>Structural Elements</u></b>	<b><u>Relational Elements</u></b>
Good governance	Trust
Safe and secure environment (Security)	Respect
Rule-of-law	Tolerance
Legitimate economy	Reconciliation
Social well-being	Personal violence
	Normalization of relations
	Empathy towards the other

**I define structural elements** as those that are thought of as institutional or physical tasks and responsibilities of reconstruction (broadly speaking), whereas relational elements are the basic human relationships, interactions, emotions, and sentiments that occur among individuals and groups at all levels in the intervention environment.

**In turn, the respective status of each element (conflict transformation indicator) can be notionally inferred** against the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum, which contains various stabilization and peacebuilding environment dynamics, parameters, and thresholds. This is done to better understand the dynamic relationship of elements with each other, and what actions might be indicated to move respective elements towards a sustainable positive peace status.

**Each interviewee is also asked several open-ended questions** to allow for qualitatively cross-checking of their responses to closed-ended questions, and to allow interviewees to add any clarifications or other comments they wish. At this time, association of indicators (data) on the structural or relational scales is notionally inferred with parameters shown on the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum based on experience, observation, and abduction theory. Further statistical research is necessary to establish an a-priori statistically significant basis for direct linkage.

The **research design** behind the composite model and framework is comprised of the following:

- An exploratory approach utilizing abduction theory (inference to the best explanation).
- A mixed-method but largely qualitatively driven exercise.
- Interviews of 50 Bosnian nationals and 50 internationals of all ethnic groups at multiple public and private sector levels.
- Findings are assessed (mean/mode/frequency/standard deviation) for indicators of the perceived status of conflict transformation structural and relational elements, then notionally inferred in association with War- to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum parameters and thresholds.

**This section also contains Figures 1 – 7, below which illustrate the rationale and development of my composite framework, and the flow of analysis facilitated by the framework and models:**

**Figure 1: Survey Questions Embedded in my Modified/Adapted MPICE Framework (Page 13):**

Interviewees are posed questions intended to elicit their perceptions (on a 1 to 7 scale) as to the status of the five structural elements, and the seven relationship elements. The mean frequencies (indicators) of their responses are calculated and subsequently channeled into structural and relational totals, which in turn, are calculated and constitute the grand total of the status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation. The total mean score for each element/indicator is shown in red.

**NOTE:** I acknowledge that the print in Figure 1 is not clear and I apologize. The survey questions are also listed below:

**Closed-Ended Survey Questions**

***(Questions Associated with Structural Elements)***

1. To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement?
2. To what degree are government institutions reestablished?
3. To what degree is the election process fair and transparent?
4. To what degree is there civic group participation in governance?
5. To what degree is political leadership polarized along ethnic lines?
6. To what degree does government have a mechanism to facilitate peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups?
7. To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?
8. To what degree do police and security forces provide a safe and secure environment for everyone regardless of their ethnicity?
9. To what degree can all refugees and IDPs return and live safely in their villages of origin anywhere in BiH?
10. To what degree is an international presence needed for security?
11. To what degree are laws fair for all ethnic groups?
12. To what degree are laws applied equally to all ethnic groups?

13. To what degree do government institutions discriminate against members of particular ethnic communities?
14. To what degree is reconstruction of infrastructure accomplished?
15. To what degree can people of any ethnic community have a business anywhere in the country?
16. To what degree is corruption and crime a factor in the economy?
17. To what degree is corruption a factor in government?
18. To what degree can people of any ethnic community buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

***(Questions Associated with Relational Elements)***

19. To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups?
20. To what degree is respect shown between different ethnic groups?
21. To what degree is tolerance shown between ethnic groups?
22. To what degree do people of different ethnicities interact in your area?
23. To what degree do students of any ethnicity feel accepted in any classroom in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24. To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups?
25. To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries?
26. To what degree is there violence against individuals due to ethnic hostility?
27. To what degree is society polarized along ethnic lines?
28. To what degree do I have hope that normalization of relations is possible between former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
29. To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war?
30. To what degree can people of different ethnic groups have empathy towards each other?

**NOTE: Survey questions** are posed to Subjects in a scheduled-structured interview to elicit responses that can be associated with Key Structural Elements of Conflict Transformation and Key Relational Elements of Conflict Transformation that pertain to current conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and are fundamental to peace and stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction. In response to each closed-ended survey question, Subjects circle one of seven possible answers according to which answer on the descriptive scale of 1 to 7 best describes, in their opinion, the current status of the thing in question, that is to say, **to what degree something is so**. There is an additional option to indicate Don't Know. The possible responses are as follows:

1 = Nil, 2 = Very Low, 3 = Low, 4 = Moderate, 5 = High, 6 = Very High, 7 = Completely, DK = Don't Know

Additionally, subjects could enter additional thoughts, or qualifications, to their checked answer in a Comments column adjacent to the questions. These comments are given in Annex A.





Figure 1: Survey Questions Embedded in Modified MPICE Framework


**Figure 2:** Below, one can see the *Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity Model* (top half of page) juxtaposed with my composite *War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model* (bottom half of page). I have taken the *Quest for Viable Peace* (Covy, Dziedic, Hawley, 2005) framework and concepts and superimposed them onto my *War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model*, resulting in a composite model, and adding to it, *negative and positive peace, war and violent disorder, and initial imposed stabilization*. The War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model is now able to reflect a full range of key peace and stability intervention dynamics (from pre-intervention war to sustainable/positive peace) by which to graphically demarcate, based upon mean responses to closed-ended questions, the status of structural or relational elements in relation to the peace and stability intervention and environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.



**Figure 3: Total Means of Primary Structural and Relational Elements** scales can be located directly above the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model. By following an arrow going down from an element-status means indicator on the Structural Elements or Relational Elements Scales to the War to Positive Peace Continuum Model below, one can notionally associate a particular element in relation to peace and stability operational dynamics and context shown on the Continuum.

**The linkage between the structural and relational elements' scales** at the top of the graphic and the threshold parameters in the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace below is notional for situational awareness purposes only. Association based on a-priori statistical significance has not yet been established. Further research would build on the current approach and attempt to achieve an a-priori basis for such an association.

Figure 3.



**NOTE:** I have superimposed elements of "Quest for Peace: International Interventions and Strategies for Conflict Transformation," Covey, Dziedzic, Hawley, 2005 (drivers of conflict, institutional performance, viable peace, imposed stability, assisted stability, self-sustaining peace, strong-weak) over my 1 to 7 Status of Elements/Negative-Positive Peace Descriptive scale.



While still in Bosnia, after all interviews were completed and survey forms filled-out, I **asked some of the interviewees to locate the status of various elements directly on the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model**. With very little explanation from me, and almost intuitively on the part of the individuals, and consistently among the individuals (national and international), they located the status of a given element in nearly the same spot along the continuum range in the model. The individuals felt that their chosen point on the *War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model* did indeed fairly well reflect the dynamics at play at the time and the overall contextual parameters in BiH for the element.

**A possibility for future research** on the identification and analysis of structural and relational elements in association with a peace and stability operation and war-to-sustainable positive peace parameters, would be to have all subjects locate the status of each element directly onto the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum itself, with a 1 to 7 scale superimposed on it.

Such an exercise, however, might limit the subject base to populations that are literate. For Bosnia, this would not be a problem since the general literacy rate is very high. This approach might need to be adjusted for countries in which literacy is low.


**As an example**, if the mean score for Question 7 (To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?) is 2.8 on the Structural Elements Scale, and if one were to draw a line straight down from 2.8 to the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model, the operational dynamics that can be associated with that are seen. In this instance, the mean score would suggest that that the status of that element is war or violent disorder.

**So if that is the case**, why is there no war or violent disorder in BiH now? I think that is explained by the presence of the international intervention authorities and the accompanying imposed stability. In theory then, without an international intervention presence, the status of such a crucial element could be expected to drag the status of other elements backward into fragile peace or worse. Conversely, it is the influence of other higher mean-status elements that resist the backward pull of a lower mean-status element(s) so that the overall condition is improved over war or violent disorder.

**When I asked a few individuals to locate directly** on the War-to-Positive Peace Continuum Model the overall status of all structural or relational elements (all things considered), or the overall situation in BiH in general, they consistently pointed to somewhere just before or after the *Viable Peace* threshold line, but qualified that the situation was deteriorating. Also, they qualified that some elements were pushing into the *Self-Sustaining Peace* zone in some municipalities, but others were regressing backwards, for example, state governance institutions. One astute individual speculated that when international officials were paying close attention to an element, it moved above the Viable Peace threshold, but when international officials were not paying attention, it regressed below the Viable Peace threshold.

**Figure 4: Grand Total Means of All Bosnia Structural and Relational Elements:**

Grand total mean scores for structural and relational elements are shown and inferred by arrows with negative and positive peace parameters, and conflict & peacebuilding thresholds indicated on the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum.



BiH - Element Status\_descriptive scale\_grand total means\_struc\_rel\_all elements\_James Adams\_4-29-10.

NOTE: I have superimposed elements of "Quest for Peace: International Interventions and Strategies for Conflict Transformation," Covey, Dziedzic, Hawley, 2005 (drivers of conflict, institutional performance, viable peace, imposed stability, assisted stability, self-sustaining peace, strong-weak) over my 1 to 7 Status of Elements/Negative-Positive Peace Descriptive scale.

**It so happens, that the unofficial placement** of the status of important stability sector elements by individual interveners and Bosnian Nationals along the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum closely coincided with actual survey results. This was done without reference to a structural or relational scale, and neither I nor the individual knew the mean score for any element, since the mean scores were not calculated until after I left Bosnia.

**The grand total mean for all structural elements is 3.6 and for relational elements it is 3.9.** Prior to arriving in BiH and conducting the survey, I fully expected that the total mean score for structural elements would be significantly higher than the total mean score for relational elements, given that the reconstruction of BiH (in structural and institutional terms) is essentially complete. I expected that given the general lack of symbolic, or otherwise, apologies or amends being made, that indicated relations and hostile sentiments would be worse. So, are the actual statistical mean scores inaccurate and questionable?

**I believe yes and no.** As discussed earlier, the fundamental flaws in the Dayton Peace Accord-based, ethno-political constitution (which was intended to be transitional), has rendered the associated governance structures and institutions highly divisive and dysfunctional, and institutionalizes discrimination. In other words, serious structural violence is systemically embedded in the post-war BiH constitution and governmental structure. This would explain the low structural element mean score, even though, on paper, the governance and structural elements are essentially in place and completed. In fact, the view that Bosnian governance is largely corrupt and dysfunctional is almost universal.

**Why is there a relatively moderate relational total-mean score** (nearly at the Viable Peace Threshold) when there are lower mean scores on individual relational elements? Again, drawing on the qualitative data, based on comments that interviewees added to their survey responses, and open-ended question comments, I suspect that the 3.9 is and is not accurate. It is accurate in that a good number of subjects, in response to relational element questions, such as “To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups?” expressed cautious optimism by telling me afterwards, “Well, I checked a higher score because I have to hope don’t I?”

At the same time, the 3.9 is not accurate in that subjects told me that nothing has been done to improve relations and as soon as another crisis comes, people will very quickly fall back into familiar verbal and physical hostilities. A reason expressed as to why there are relatively neutral relations or little manifest personal violence now, is that most people are war weary, and international and national authorities and police are very sensitive about keeping small conflict incidents from exploding into a crisis (as most subjects told me). In other words, while local authorities are actively suppressing cultural violence, little is being done to meaningfully improve relations (re-relating?). The serious structural dysfunctionality clearly works against improving relational elements.

**I also asked a handful of individuals**, after interviews, what they thought needed to be fixed first in order to have normalization: *structure* or *relations*. Some immediately said the structure needed to be fixed first, then, everything else will follow. Some immediately said that fixing relations had to occur first or there would be no cooperation, with fixing the structure. Some said both had to be worked on simultaneously.


**Then I asked what is holding up fixing the structure the most**, the structure itself or the relationship problem? Some of those who at first said - fix the structure first - then switched over and said that relations are holding up progress on structure. Also, interestingly, I found that of those who suffered serious personal losses during the war, nearly all said relations needed to be fixed first.

Figure 5: Bosnia Interviewee Demographics Table (Only Page 1 is shown to indicate the broad demographics cross-section) James Adams, 2012

<p><b>CODES:</b> Education: Elementary – E, Secondary – S, University – U, MS/MA, Doctorate - D                      Military Experience - Mil                      Citizenship - Nationality: Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina/Bosnian – BiH/Bsn, Republika Srpska - RS, Serb - S, Bosniak - Bsk, Croat - C, Roma – R, Int’l – I (or dual citizenship)                      Ethnic Group: Bosniak – Bsk/Msl, Croat – C, S – Serb, Roma – R, Other – O                      Religion: Muslim/Islam – M/Isl, Serbian Orthodox – O, Catholic – Chl, Christian – Chr, Non-Associated - NA                      Political Orientation (Pol Orien): Liberal – L, Moderate – M, Nationalist - N                      Entity: Bosniak-Croat Federation – Fed, Republika Srpska – RS                      Urban (city) – U, Rural (village) – R</p>													<p>International Organization or Agency – IO/AG                      International Non-Governmental Organization – INGO                      Local Non-Governmental Organization – LNGO                      BiH Authorities – BiH Auth: Local – L, Canton – C, Entity – E, State - S                      Institute: State – S, Private – P                      Sector: Government – G, Security – Se, Law – L; Economy – E, Social - So                      Level: Representative – Rep, Officer – Ofr, Staff – Stf, Worker – Wkr                      NA – Not Applicable                      X = check mark</p>							
Personal Demographics: (1-50 National), (51-100 International)													Sectors & Levels							
Subject	Age	Gender	Edc - Elem Scnd Univ MS/MA Doc	Mil Exp - Yes - No	Citizenship	Nationality	Ethnic Grp.	Religion	Pol Orien - Lib Mod Nat	Occupation	Entity - Fed RS	Urban - Rural	Individual	IO - AG	INGO	LNGO	Govt. Auth & Level - Muni Canton Entity State	Institute - State Priv.	Sector - Gov Scrtcy Law Econ Soc	Level - Rep Ofr Stf Wkr
1.	30-44	M	S	Y	BiH	Bsk	Msl	Isl	L	Electrical Tech.	Fed	U	X						E	O
2.	45-64	F	D	N	Bsn	Bsn/I	Bsc	Msl	M	Diplomat	Fed	U					S		G	R
3.	30-44	F	U	N	BiH	BiH	---	NA	L	Public Relations	Fed	U		X					GESo	O
4.	65-79	M	U	Y	Bsn	Bsn	Bsn	Isl	L	Retired Govt. Ofcl.	Fed	U	X				S		G/E	O
5.	30-44	M	S	Y	BiH	BiH	Bsk	NA	L	Governance Coord.	Fed	U		X					G	S
6.	45-64	M	U	Y	BiH	BiH	S	NA*	L	Security Guard	Fed	U	X	X					SeE	W
7.	30-44	M	U	N	C/I	C/I	C	NA	L	Spokesperson	Fed	U		X					GLE	O

**Figure 6: Peace Operation Activity Levels:**

The Peace Operation Activity Levels graphic illustrates the placement and interactions of actors and levels typically involved in a peace and stabilization operation environment. This graphic is a composite of various concepts and intended to aid field orientation.



**Figure 7: The Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection Model** below (Figure 7) is designed to assist with determining an overall intervention strategy based on desired outcomes and, importantly, awareness of intrinsic elements and dynamics associated with various intervention approaches. The Model reflects three primary kinds of information by which to consider what type of intervention approach, or approaches, would be appropriate for a given dispute (specific incident) or conflict (multiple disputes in an ongoing conflict). Note: Although I cite numerous terms and authors in my models, I alone am responsible for how the terms are used and characterized in the models, and any errors or dispute that may result.

The Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection model contains three sections:

**Section A. -- *General Nature of an Intervention Approach;***

**Section B. -- *Specific Intervention Approaches;* and**

**Section C. -- *Dynamics Associated with Intervention Approaches***

Readers will notice that Conflict Transformation is shown twice on the model as a specific intervention approach. This is in acknowledgment of the two different interpretations of the concept, broadly speaking, by Track 1 and Track 2+ actors as discussed earlier. The dynamics associated with either Conflict Transformation approach (See Section C.) still applies as indicated.

**To use the model**, an analyst or practitioner can place a vertical line along a given intervention approach under consideration, run the line up through **Section C.** (Dynamics Associated with Intervention Approaches), and then run the line down through **Section A** (General Nature of an Intervention Approach). All dynamics (listed horizontally) in Sections A and B that the vertical line intersects are dynamics commonly associated with the type of intervention selected for consideration. Ranges of particular dynamics (listed horizontally) are indicated by arrows with end-brackets.

As an example of an intervention approach selection, Conflict Transformation has been highlighted (circled in red) for consideration. As can be seen, the **red vertical hyphenated line highlighting Conflict Transformation on the right side of the model crosses Resolution and Transformation in Section A.** This indicates that the general nature of the intervention is designed and intended to get at resolution and possibly relational and values transformation -- as generally imagined by Track 2+ actors.

Going upwards through Section C, the **red line intersects Positive Peace** as a notional intent, **Identity Focus** as a goal, **Relational Focus** as a goal, **Collaboration** as a means, and **Power of Influence** as a means (versus legal or raw power as an intervention means).

Continuing upward, the **red line intersects Durability of Agreement** close to the High end of the durability range (versus a low durability expectation towards the left of the durability range).

The **red line intersects the Level of Control range** on the low end. This indicates that Conflict Transformation in this instance would be expected to require a low level of control over the conflict parties as opposed to Track 1 oriented Conflict Transformation on the left side of the model in which a high level of control over conflicting parties and the situation in general would likely be necessary.

The **red line intersects Sources of Control** towards the few in number needed to control the situation and intervention (a high number of sources required typically involves diplomatic, military, police, UN agencies, and NGOs, etc., needed in response to complex emergencies).

**To be clear on another point**, I believe that different circumstances call for different approaches. As mentioned earlier, sometimes a Track 1 approach is needed; sometimes a Track 2 through 9 approach is more productive. What the Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection model provides is a more complete orientation on the factors involved and options available. Probably often as not, both approaches are needed in varying combinations.

Finally, continuing upwards, the **red line intersects the Subjective (interactive process based) range**. This indicates that interactive processes are subjective by nature as compared to, say, Adjudication, which is based on the implementation of codified law and is, presumably, a more straight-forward objective process requiring less subjective considerations.

### **Section A (General Nature of Intervention Approach - Terms):**

**Conflict Settlement** -- interrupts hostilities for the time being without either identifying their underlying sources or creating a system of conflict management (Burton, 1990; Richard Rubenstein, 1996), (forcefully stop violence).

**Conflict Management** -- aims at moderating or 'civilizing' the effects of conflict without necessarily addressing the underlying causes and conditions.

**Conflict Resolution** -- attempts to get at the root causes and conditions of destructive conflict and to eliminate them – if necessary by altering the system that embodies or produces them.

**Conflict Transformation** -- a change or refinement in the consciousness and character of individual human beings. Implies individual moral development, although this kind of change will very likely lead to changes in social institutions as well (Bush and Folger, 1994); Hence, also aim at macro-level systemic changes through reconstruction and development, designing and implementing new mechanisms that are not available before the destructive conflict in question.

A new frame for viewing; a different set of categories. A changed sense of what is real and what is possible. Parties change from identity statements, which include answers, accusations, negative energy, and breast-beating, to a joint searching in a cooperative and analytical fashion – with the emphasis on creativity. A critical mass of changed individual behaviors results in optimism that a solution can be created. A transformation ultimately of the substance of the issues and position themselves. This often requires redistribution of resources, recognition (or at least acceptance) of common needs and a sharing of power (Laue, 1987);

A paradigmatic shift is articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution of issues and toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships (Lederach, 1997).

**Section B (Specific Intervention Approaches - Terms):**

**Extra-Legal:** Outside of legal or constitutional context; without due process.

**Adjudication/Legal Response:** court-ordered legal processes; litigation.

**Peace Support/Peace Enforcement:** Military and police actions in support of peacemaking and peacebuilding, for example, observation, command and control, force, liaison, logistics, presence, and security (Dave Davis lecture, 2000).

**Peacemaking/Peacebuilding:** (Dave Davis lecture, 2000; Boutros-Ghali, 1992). **Note:** peacemaking and peacebuilding are each included twice on this model; once in relation to settlement and management, and again in relation to resolution and transformation. The dual locations of peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, is because they take place in settlement--management contexts (negative peace processes) as well as in resolution--transformation contexts (positive peace processes). This is not to imply that negative peace coercive measures are never appropriate; again, the need is to have an effective balance of negative peace oriented protective force and positive peace oriented processes as appropriate.

**Arbitration:** A legitimate and authoritative third party provides a binding judgment through consideration of the merits of the opposing positions, and imposes a settlement deemed to be fair and just (often by court order)(Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Power Mediation:** The intermediary provides the functions of pure mediation and adds the use of leverage in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments to move the parties toward a settlement (Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Power Negotiation:** Conflict parties utilize various realpolitik negotiating techniques to apply positive and negative pressures to the opposing conflict party or parties to protect or gain leverage for their respective positions at the expense of the opposing party or parties.

**No intervention:** self-explanatory.

**Principled Negotiation:** Negotiating parties focus on basic interests (not positions or persons) and shared problem-solving to generate mutually satisfying outcomes while utilizing fair, objective standards to efficiently arrive at agreements that meet the legitimate interests of each negotiating side (and associated communities) to the extent possible, and are durable (Roger Fisher and Ury, 1981, 1991).

**Pure Mediation:** The facilitation of a negotiated settlement on a set of specific substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, control of information and suggestion of alternatives (Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Pre-negotiation:** Functions to structure negotiation by specifying the boundaries, the participants, and potentially the agenda in an exploratory, noncommittal manner. Improves the relationship between the conflict parties before dealing with substantive issues; helps decision makers reduce uncertainty and manage complexity in a low risk and low cost manner (Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Provention/Problem Solving Workshop:** Assist parties in a conflict in making a deep analysis of their conflicted relationships, revealing the hidden data of goals and motivations, enabling an accurate costing of their tactics and policies, and assisting in the discovery of acceptable options; define accurately the interests that are negotiable, and the basic needs and values that are not, and to assist the parties to discover options that are acceptable in terms of their interests and that satisfy their needs (Burton and Dukes, 1990). **Provention:** Steps taken to remove sources of conflict, and more positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control behaviors; a decision making process in which the future is



analyzed and anticipated, and as a result policy decisions are taken to remove the sources of likely disputes and conflict (Burton, 1990, 1997; Burton and Dukes, 1990).

**Sustained Dialogue:** A facilitated five-stage interactive process that brings conflict parties together to change the nature of their relationships -- not bring conflicting parties together to negotiate for assets or political settlements. It is intended to probe the dynamics of contentious relationships that underlie the causes and conditions of a conflict and gradually develop a capacity for jointly designing actions to change the relationships for the better. Then participants go on to decide how to take those insights and steps to the wider community (Saunders, 1999).

**Integrated Peacebuilding:** Development of local capacity to design and positively affect social change and structures by linking crisis management and long-term, future-oriented time frames; generate understanding of crisis issues as connected to systemic roots and develop approaches that explicitly anchor issues within a set of relationships and subsystems; involve grassroots and top leadership in conflict resolution--transformation processes, especially mid-range leadership who can cultivate relationships and influence groups vertically within societies and horizontally across societal divides (Lederach, 1997).

**Psychopolitical Dialogue:** An interactive process whereby facilitators guide a five-stage process containing the following elements: establishing safety, communalization and bereavement, rebuilding trust and the capacity to trust, reestablishing personal and social morality, and reintegrating and restoring democratic discourse (Volkan 1999).

**Victim-Offender Conferencing:** A process whereby the offender and victim meet face to face; the offender has already admitted the offense; The meeting is facilitated and chaired by a trained mediator, preferably a community volunteer...Both parties are encouraged to tell their stories. Both get a chance to ask questions...They also talk about the impact and implication of this experience. When they have done this, they decide together what will be done about it. Once they come to an agreement, they sign a written contract for restitution in the form of financial compensation or means such as community service (Zehr, 1990; Umbreit, 1994).

### **Section C (Dynamics Associated with Intervention Approaches):**


Section C contains a variety of key dynamics common to conflict situations and interventions. The listing of dynamics in Section C is, of course, not exhaustive, but intended to provide a general starting-place orientation for analysis (a tentative first-look at some of the primary facets of particular intervention for consideration) and an initial feel for an intervention's appropriateness and viability of implementation.

#### **General Instructions for Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection (Figure 7).**

- 1) Based on all available information, considerations, and desired outcomes, an analyst and practitioner would assess approaches (**Section B**), and associated general category types (**Section A**) ranged across the bottom of the model that appear to be the most suited to the desired intervention strategy.
- 2) They would review the dynamics associated with the potential intervention approach(es) (**Section C**) for confirmation of desired intervention qualities or indications that the intended intervention contains dynamics or elements not desired, in which case, other interventions may need to be considered.
- 3) They would consult pertinent literature and other resources specific to the tentative approach(es).

- 4) They would consult appropriate organizations, decision-makers, conflict parties, and other pertinent actors regarding the viability and appropriateness of the tentative intervention and associated objectives, timeframe, availability of expertise, funds, and other resources needed. And,
- 5) They would select an intervention approach or approaches (**Section B**) appropriate to the situation and the meeting of desired objectives. They would advise and coordinate for implementation as needed.

Figure 7: Intervention Assessment & Approach Selection Model



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## CONCLUSIONS

### GENERAL

The following comments comprise my general conclusions and recommendations concerning the utility of the composite framework concept and associated models in connection with the assessment of the Bosnia intervention environment, clearly an intervention and environment stalled in negative peace:

- The status of peace and stability interventions can be assessed in structural and relational element terms, and in notionally inferred association with negative and positive peace parameters.
- The status of conflict transformation structural and relational elements can be discerned.
- Structural and cultural violence is suggested in the status of structural elements.
- Positive peace oriented measures alone are often not sufficient to ensure stabilization or sustainable positive peace.
- Negative peace oriented measures alone are not sufficient to ensure sustainable positive peace.
- Negative peace oriented measures alone can ensure sustainable negative peace until inevitable revolution, civil war, or violent civil disorder erupts, or until combined negative and positive peace measures (if utilized) can push the overall status of structural and relational elements past viable peace and sustainable positive peace thresholds respectively.
- Negative and positive peace oriented measures can and, when possible, should proceed simultaneously and in concert for optimal progress towards viable peace and sustainable positive peace status.

**Fundamentally, a researcher or decision maker can explore the perceptions** of local nationals and international interveners on the status of structural and relational elements, contextually, in a peace and stability operation environment. This can be done, although at this time, without indicating the exact extent to which those perceptions correspond to conditions on the ground. Nevertheless, a close approximation is possible, and perceptions matter because they drive conflicts.

**The important take-away of this analytical approach** is that the composite frameworks and models can facilitate a common intuitive language and understanding (picture) of a particular conflict's elements and dynamics; and having accomplished that, enable conflict party and intervenor actors to more readily discuss viable ways out of a stalled negative peace status. The approach pushes towards a common picture and common solutions, and a means by which to better track, coordinate, and balance efforts in respective intervention stability sectors.

**I posed the question:** Can structural and relational elements be identified in relation to specific operational tasks such as diplomacy, security, political, economic and institutional reconstruction, and civil society building? I believe that the question can be answered now, at least indirectly, within the five basic stability sectors named previously utilizing the composite framework. Also, essentially, the same answer applies to the identification of operational tasks in relation to negative and positive peace. The distinction is that relational elements and positive peace oriented measures are more narrowly focused on personal, group, community, or societal relationship improvement and the consciousness-shifting of values.

**This principle could apply to any task in any sector.** The distinction is a matter of focus. Structural and negative peace oriented measures tend to involve coercion and/or implementation of institutional and technical solutions (Track 1 type Conflict Transformation), whether relationship improvement or consciousness-shifting is expected or not. Nevertheless, Conflict Transformation constitutes two sides of the same intervention coin.

**It is apparent to me that progress** towards a general status of sustainable positive peace involving all structural and relational elements requires due attention to negative and positive peace oriented measures and activities on all fronts and at all levels, including attention to relationship and values consciousness shifting, which can be associated with any task in any sector of activity, structural or relational, Track 1 or Track 2+. There is no overriding reason, beyond political ones, that relationally focused activities cannot be attempted within diplomatic, security, political, economic and institutional reconstruction contexts (governance, broadly speaking), as well as in more traditionally relationship focused civil society peacebuilding.

The status of different structural and relational elements may be at different points to the left or the right of the Viable Peace or Fragile Peace thresholds - as inferred on the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum -- however, the need and task is make the policy-calculated efforts needed to move all elements beyond the Viable or Fragile Peace thresholds into a Sustainable Positive Peace status. Essentially, this requires awareness-raising on the part of interveners and conflict parties alike, regarding the dynamics and processes involved and the expected benefits. There is a need for all concerned to increase focus on relationship improvement and consciousness-shifting in particular concerning intra-state conflict.

**Based on the data collected and subsequent analyses,** it is apparent that structural elements and relational elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina are nearly equally problematic and in need of greater attention, since both primary elements (the grand structural mean: 3.6, and the grand relational mean: 3.9) fall within the *Fragile Peace* zone, short of the *Viable Peace* threshold, when inferred against the *War- to- Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum*.

It is clear, based on the situated primary elements and associated dynamics that structure and relationship, and the intervention and environment itself in Bosnia, are in a status of *Negative Peace*; a fragile, if not precarious, circumstance requiring ongoing *Assisted Stability*.

**Can structural and relational elements be assessed in a peace and stability intervention and environment context? Yes.** In the Bosnian context as an example, given that Bosnian nationals and international interveners were able to distinguish structural elements and dynamics from relational elements and dynamics without much difficulty, and apply scaled ratings to those elements in relational

(cultural) and structural terms; Yes, there is clear indication that it is possible to distinguish structural from relational elements.

**Can the status of *negative peace* and *positive peace* in a peace and stability intervention be assessed and explained and thereby shed light on the dynamics and negative and positive peace parameters of an intervention stalled in negative peace? Yes.** Utilization of the Likert-type structural and relational survey scales and derived data, in conjunction with the *War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model*, give clear indication that it is possible to identify negative and positive peace parameters in association with a peace and stability operation and environment. This involves coordinated use of the composite frame work, in conjunction with triangulated observations and expert opinion. Therefore, associated intervention dynamics can be tentatively identified, including negative and positive peace parameters.

**Can *positive peace processes* be effectively implemented in a peace operation environment? Yes, but it depends on location and timing.** The data suggest that some elements can be in a status of sustainable, perhaps positive peace, in one location, or at one level, while the same element is in a fragile and negative peace status at another location, or at a different level. And so, sustainable positive peace processes may be possible within certain locations or sectors of an intervention area, but a generalized state of sustainable positive peace may or may not exist in a broader area. So it does appear that positive peace processes can be implemented in a peace operation environment, although a general state of sustainable/positive peace may or may not exist.

Pertaining to all of the points made so far in this section, I add a qualifier: Conflict resolution implicitly contains the essence of conflict transformation, the conceptual heir apparent of conflict resolution, if the transformation is associated with conflict party personal and relationship change. Otherwise, conflict transformation would be implicit in conflict management if the transformation is predominately structural in nature without benefit of positive human interaction and consciousness change.

## FURTHER COMMENTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY INTERVENTIONS

**Different conceptualizations of conflict transformation** pertaining to peace and stability interventions and environments and, consequently, different normative responses, imply possible cross-purposed actions. In the context of a peace and stability intervention, this could mean an implementation void or imbalance. In terms of determining where elemental needs require timely adjustment or not, utilization of the composite *War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum* framework, models, and data collection instrument appear to be a viable set of tools for accommodating discussion on identifying elements, issues, trends, priorities and where adjustments might be needed.

**It also appears that planners and decision makers can utilize** the structural and relational data and scales for analytical purposes to better identify what the status is of a particular element, and to identify what associated contextual dynamics to expect in relation to that element status. Consequently, policy and planning are better informed, and focus and resources can be more readily adjusted accordingly to move problematic elements towards and into *Viable Peace* and *Sustainable Positive Peace* status.

**In essence, the composite framework and models draw a picture** of key elements, dynamics, and context parameters that are clear for all to see and discuss. This is particularly useful for those who are new to field work or not familiar with peace and stability interventions or environments. It would also be useful for conflict parties who are focused on events without benefit of time for reflection to aid discussions.

It is useful here to repeat make a qualification: Conflict resolution implicitly contains the essence of conflict transformation, the conceptual heir apparent of conflict resolution -- if the transformation is associated with conflict party personal and relationship transformation. Otherwise, conflict transformation would be implicit in conflict management if the transformation is predominately structural in nature without benefit of positive human interaction and consciousness change.

I believe that it is reasonable to assume that all concerned, who are briefed on the status of particular elements and context dynamics and parameters utilizing the composite framework and models, would be more fully informed about the dynamics associated with a particular conflict and be more readily able to discern additional actions to take. Further, I think that subsequent decisions made, and the resulting outcomes, could be expected to increase the chances of interveners and conflict parties (not exclusively political elites) being more mutually collaborative, utilizing the Framework and models as a common guide between them.

**This could apply to activities of** civilians or military, governmental organizations (GOs), international organizations (IOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) operating in conflict-prone environments.

Utilization of the **War to Sustainable Positive Peace Framework** and graphic models in face-to-face briefings with interveners and conflict parties, is likely to improve the chances of mutual understanding and collaboration by virtue of having a tangible picture of the conflict and intervention factors and options that can enable all-concerned to more readily see them and, thereby, operate (literally) from the same page.

## ANNEX A.

Annex A. provides a sampling of actual interviewee qualitative responses to the 30 closed-ended survey questions, and 4 survey open-ended questions, which have much to convey to students and leaders of interventions. I add some analysis.

### Subject Comments Regarding Their Responses to Closed-Ended Questions

**This constitutes a test of the Survey Instrument to capture nuance.** Some respondents qualified some of their selected answers or otherwise added a comment, for example, Question 1, which inquires about the level of support that political leaders have for the peace agreement. A typical comment pertaining to that question was that each ethnic group supports only those parts of the peace agreement that are advantageous to their own ethnic group. An example regarding particular ethnicities: Many non-Serbs claim that Serbs support the Dayton Peace Agreement much more than Bosniaks or Croats because it “legitimizes Serb war gains” and prevents a one-state union, which Bosniaks want and precludes a three state union which the Croats want; so non-Serb respondents selected the middle ground (3.89, moderate) in response to the question. At the same time, most Serbs claimed to be opposed to the peace agreement since they wanted a state of their own. This type of response occurred in connection with some other questions and that is why, following the survey pilot test, I added a “Qualification Comments” section next to the questions section in the survey form. This enabled capture of explanations of responses to closed-ended responses.

Below I include a sampling of actual qualifications by subjects for each of the 18 *Structural* associated questions and 12 *Relational* associated questions. In the Structural Questions section, I paraphrase or summarize, or add an observation of my own as needed. In the Relational Questions section, I show only actual subject responses with no paraphrasing or summarizing by me.

Again, closed-ended questions were responded to in terms of the following Likert-type scale:

1) Nil, 2) Very Low, 3) Low, 4) Moderate, 5) High, 6) Very High, 7) Completely; (DK for Don't Know was available for selection).

### ***(Questions Associated with Structural Elements)***

#### **(Actual Subject responses)**

1. *To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement (3.9)?*
  - Comment provided above.



2. *To what degree are government institutions reestablished (4.4)?*
  - Subjects consistently qualified that the institutions of government were all in place but were mostly dysfunctional and corrupt along ethnic lines as per the Dayton Agreement ethno-political/constitutional criteria and nationalist dominated elections. Some subjects qualified that some local municipal governments were less corrupt, more effective, and cooperative with each other.
3. *To what degree is the election process fair and transparent (4.9)?*
  - Generally, subjects qualified here that elections were fair and transparent, but nevertheless marked their answers lower because of the use of fear tactics and intimidation by ethno-politicized nationalist parties (usually headed by hardliners or ultra-hardliners, or war criminals in some cases) to get reelected. Moderate parties generally did poorly.
4. *To what degree is there civic group participation in governance (3.1)?*
  - A number of NGOs have been created since the war (many were supported by UN or western aid agencies) to advocate for civil and human rights, and mental health and education services and so forth. However, as some NGO managers have explained to me, there are too few of them and they have very limited access to political offices that are often ethno-politicized and corrupt. A number of NGOs are arms of ethno-political parties. There is little sense of personal civil participation or opportunity.
5. *To what degree is political leadership polarized along ethnic lines (6.3)?*
  - Response to this question drew one of the highest levels of consensus (lowest standard deviation) scores corroborated by the fact that hardline or ultra-hardline ethno-nationalists continue to dominant national politics, including a Bosniak president who was favored by Western diplomats as a promising moderate who later became an ultra-nationalist.
6. *To what degree does government have a mechanism to facilitate peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups (2.8)?*
  - Subject response to this question essentially repeats that for Questions 2, 4, and 5. No concrete example of such a mechanism was given.
7. *To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness (2.8)?*
  - This is another example of high consensus among subjects regarding an issue. Subjects clearly believe that governance and the political-economy have not yet reached a moderate level of controlling corruption and lawlessness.
8. *To what degree do police and security forces provide a safe and secure environment for everyone regardless of their ethnicity (4.5)?*
  - Subjects qualified that they felt generally safe in the cities and when staying in areas predominately of their own ethnicity. Also there was consensus that police generally are very attuned to keeping inter-ethnic confrontations to a minimum. Nevertheless, a qualification given a number of times is that some are very uncomfortable living or traveling in areas where they see police or authorities on the street that are known war criminals and/or rapists etc.

9. *To what degree can all refugees and IDPs return and live safely in their villages of origin anywhere in BiH (3.6)?*
- The great majority of Subjects qualified that they could indeed return to and probably live safely in their villages of origin, but significant qualifications were specified: 1) Someone else might be living in their house and/or have taken over their business property, and it could take years to get it back if ever; 2) Discrimination based on ethnicity makes it nearly impossible to get a job or a decent job; 3) Their family, or their business, would be shunned by the community if now made up of a majority of a different ethnicity, which applies now to many villages and towns in Bosnia.
10. *To what degree is an international presence needed for security (4.6)?*
- Although some Bosniaks were ambivalent on this point, most Bosniaks preferred that the international presence continue in order to safeguard their interests. Most Serbs want the presence to end as soon as possible. Croats were in between on this point.
11. *To what degree are laws fair for all ethnic groups (4.2)?*
- The moderate mean score on this question is, as a number of Subjects explained to me, not so much because the laws discriminate against some and not others, but that the systemic ethno-political constitutional mandates induce discrimination equally against all minorities regardless of ethnicity.
12. *To what degree are laws applied equally to all ethnic groups (3.8)?*
- See response to Question 11.
13. *To what degree do government institutions discriminate against members of particular ethnic communities (4.2)?*
- See response to Question 11.
14. *To what degree is reconstruction of infrastructure accomplished (3.9)?*
- Reconstruction in this case, as explained to Subjects, refers to physical infrastructure: roads, railways, bridges, transportation, communication facilities, electric and water supply, schools, hospitals, etc.
15. *To what degree can people of any ethnic community have a business anywhere in the country (4.4)?*
- The responses to this question parallel those of Question 9. The great majority of Subjects qualified that they felt that they had the right to have a business anywhere in the country and that that principle would not be challenged. The difficulties are that: 1) Someone else might be occupying their former business property and it could take years to get it back if ever; 2) New ethnic-majority officials make the licensing/permit process very difficult and residents and other business people would effectively boycott their reestablished business. In other words, they would not be welcome.
16. *To what degree is corruption and crime a factor in the economy (5.7)?*
- Essentially, the great majority of Bosnians of all ethnicities believe that corruption in the economy is High or Very High, referring to the situation as a widespread system of corruption-cooperation and bribery demands at all levels in the economy.

17. *To what degree is corruption a factor in government (5.6)?*

- According to Subjects, corruption in government is closely tied to getting government jobs and corruption in the economy; that is to say a corrupt politicized economy with close collusion between government officials and organized crime syndicates at macro levels, and common bribe demands at local levels for services to be handled without delays or other difficulties. The problem increases in instances of minority ethnicity applications and requests.

18. *To what degree can people of any ethnic community buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina (4.5)?*

- Generally the same response applies as given for Questions 9 and 15. Subjects generally did not believe that their right to buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia would be questioned, but that the process of doing so would be made difficult and they would be harassed, shunned, and made to feel unwelcome if they were in a minority status in the new location.

***(Questions Associated with Relational Elements)***

19. *To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups (3.8)?*

- Although there may be normal appearing interaction on the surface level, deep down, a sense of betrayal is now embedded.
- But doesn't work when people with extremist views are involved.
- My sense is that individuals trust one another. It is group distrust that is more the issue.
- People of different ethnic groups have helped each other and common people were always getting along, they are easily tricked and manipulated by political leadership; same in WWI, WWII, and 1991-95.
- The issue here is that of pre-war neighbors or post-conflict neighbors.
- The system forces segregation and distrust, especially among the youth via schools and ethnically cleansed areas.
- There has been no serious discussion between ethnic groups about the war. I feel pressure of Ustase on my neck.
- This improved slowly after 1995, but has dropped considerably because of political polarization since 2006.
- Trust towards people you know but not towards an ethnic group.
- Trust?, towards the 5th Column people in Sarajevo - No!
- A lot of distrust, amplified by politicians who benefit from it.

20. *To what degree is respect shown between different ethnic groups (3.8)?*

- Respect is not possible when Serbs use heavy equipment to dig-up mass graves and rebury bodies in more dispersed mass graves.
- 3 generally, but at individual level the situation is better.
- Depends on locale (local football team in Zvornik is called Genocide); it's OK in Sarajevo, Banja Luka.
- Depends on the person.

- Ethnicity always comes first. Though in the absence of direct conflict, respect and cooperation does exist.
  - There are some striking instances of disrespect; Older, more sophisticated people show more respect; younger people and villagers, less.
  - When there is no trouble, everybody is friendly; when there is trouble, fast/hard separation follows.
21. *To what degree is tolerance shown between ethnic groups (3.9)?*
- Depends on location: city is more tolerant, village is least tolerant, town is in between. Bosniaks in general are more tolerant than Serbs or Croats.
  - Young more problematic than old.
22. *To what degree do people of different ethnicities interact in your area (4.5)?*
- Communities try to stick to themselves; for friends, this rule does not apply.
  - In Sarajevo yes, otherwise...
  - Less mixing of population after the war.
  - Most places are ethnically cleansed now; people can enter hotels, restaurants, and buildings etc. dominated by another ethnicity but generally do not.
  - Not many integrated areas left to try interacting in.
  - Segregation is growing all the time; people don't know people anymore from different ethnic groups.
  - The presence of the International Community allows people to interact.
23. *To what degree do students of any ethnicity feel accepted in any classroom in Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.2)?*
- 6 in FBiH, and 2 in RS.
  - Education segregated, ethnocentric; Sarajevo much less multi-ethnic now than before the war; previous long-time Sarajevans more tolerant than newer war related urban migrants from villages/small towns.
  - From my local experience, on the surface - higher (5), otherwise moderate (4); 5 for Canton 1; 4 for Canton Prijedor.
  - Many schools are officially or de facto segregated.
  - My experience shows bad and getting worse.
  - Newer teachers work to separate kids as opposed to integrate them.
  - Only university students.
  - Special events maybe ok, but on a daily basis, no.
  - Special problem: two-schools-one roof, separate schedules or entrances, Some cantons in FBiH, also RS.
  - Still many separate classes and curricula.
  - Teachers do not allow children to interact; Students are manipulated by political elites, parents, and religious leaders to disassociate from children of other ethnic groups.
  - The problem is that school curricula and teaching is biased towards one ethnicity; Teachers emphasize respective ethnic perspective in instruction.
  - There is some mixing at the secondary school level, but not at the primary school level.

24. *To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups (4.5)?*

- Again, this depends on the locale and the situation. On a national level, there is a long way to go.
- Collectively, Serbs deny wrongdoing, individually, Serbs wish for reconciliation. Different responses between intellectual levels, group levels, and different groups.
- Depends on where; Urban areas tend to be more reconciliation friendly.
- First, conflict parties need to reconcile within their own groups, within their own pain, then work on reconciling with other ethnic groups (many felt betrayed by their own groups and leaders).
- Generational change is necessary and reinterpretation of personal values.
- If we exclude extremist minorities.
- In 15-20 years, Serbia will have a major impact on BiH; When Serbia matures past its nationalism episode, it can/will have a major pos. influence on RS (things in RS will settle down).
- Maybe in 100 years.
- Obstacles are: unenlightened population, influence of religion, low cultural standard, emotional factor, character traits (hate, envy, spite), influence of communism, incapability of humility.
- One has to hope, but: a) Election system should be changed, 2) It took other countries 40 years, so why should it be quickly done? Reconciliation is when ethnicity doesn't matter.
- Only with change in the political system.
- People of different ethnicities don't talk about important things such as religion, the war, harm done; We need to be able to speak frankly about differences.
- Reconciliation has not taken place yet; there is still much stoking of open wounds in the media; Reconciliation needs a solid foundation, bridges need to be built; IC needs to build linkages.
- Reconciliation: If there is remorse, and a desire, reconciliation will go forward.
- Structural divisions created by the constitution, therefore, structure causes obstructions to improvement in ethnic relations.
- Timeframe sensitive: people have to see a future for themselves and their families.
- Very high if/when citizens get courageous and visionary leadership.
- With time and possibly better with future economic investment, jobs and recruitment on western models.
- We have more than one truth.

25. *To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries (2.7)?*

- Difficult to prosecute and discover crimes at the same time; first discover the crimes, then prosecute; allow families of victims to get their dead back; Admit that not all Serbs are killers.
- For Bosniaks, wreath laying by RS at Srebrenica would be more meaningful than jailing Milosovich and Karadic.
- Justice is needed; criminals walk freely among their own people.
- Legally mostly yes, emotionally no.
- Need better economy and less pressure from religious leaders.

- Non-war crimes are prosecuted, but there is no cooperation on the prosecution of war crimes.
- Offers of amends-making are subject to political pressures.
- People feel there is no justice and no way for victims to ask the guilty for it; Houses not rebuilt for victims without connections (corruption/favoratism).
- Politicians have not done anything to make up for me having to spend my teenage years in the war in Sarajevo.
- Really don't know how people feel; What is felt and what is reported may well be very different.
- Returnees are not satisfied regarding amends.
- The idea of Transitional Justice has only recently been introduced to the people of BiH.
- The method is "lets not talk about it, or one group outbidding another on who is the greater victim; but no real amends are made. There is competition about who was the most wronged.
- The whole BiH society has PTSD. Serbs say that there were logically more Serbs killed than Muslims since there are more Muslims proportionately, so proportionately more Serbs were killed.
- There are thousands of war crimes on record for which no action has been taken.
- There is no justice e.g., Srebrenica.
- This is the Balkans, even educated people have their own version of history.
- Very little, the problem goes back for centuries.
- Very little. Hard to see beyond Mladic's arrest-trial and stepped-up prosecutions of local level war criminals.
- Was high, but is decreasing rapidly.

26. *To what degree is there violence against individuals due to ethnic hostility (3.1)?*

- 3 for FBiH, 6 for RS.
- Depends on the region.
- Generally not a problem though there is random unorganized incidents. Hooliganism can be a trigger.
- If discrimination, then high.
- In schools, I'm hearing.
- Mental Vs. physical violence.
- Mostly at sports events or around them; There is a lot of potential for violence against individuals.
- No, except for violence against Roma persons.
- Not so much because of segregated living; Graffiti is indicative of latent violence.
- This is not widespread, but the fear of it keeps people segregated.

27. *To what degree is society polarized along ethnic lines (5.4)?*

- Depends on region.
- Everything divides: press, political parties, societal issues.
- The very purpose of the current constitution is to divide and feed the negatives of ethnic division; Constitutional/institutional reform would dissolve ethnic animosities.
- There are more divisions arising than unifying forces.

28. *To what degree do I have hope that normalization of relations is possible between former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina (4.9)?*

- At the moment, low, due to the fact that education is totally divided.
- But not in my lifetime.
- But only with force and political changes.
- I am an optimist.
- I have confidence that a common denominator can be found, but not without a radical change that breaks the current oligarchical political system.
- If BiH splits, then chances are very low; if BiH proceeds reasonably well to EU accession, then chances are high for normalization.
- It would be possible if it weren't for the leadership who make it impossible to normalize relations.
- None.
- Ordinary people want normal relations, but politicians don't; politicians push politics of fear.
- Some days I have hope, and others not.
- The EU is making things technical (arrangements) as opposed to emotional/nationalistic.
- Time and prosperity heals things, opens issues up, then deal with/move immigration and separation activities/systems i.e., elections etc.

29. *To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war (3.6)?*

- Attitudes are worse now than before the war.
- Attitudes that led to the war were not of those people in the country, it came from outside (initially); The attitudes that led to the war are still around although tempered.
- Attitudes, despite recent nationalistic fervor, have changed in terms of no appetite for war by anyone.
- Before the war, I didn't look at people as Croat, Serb, or Muslim, now I do; now most people do; Now there is little inter-marriage, before the war there was.
- Causes of war were power struggles coupled with brain washing and media campaigns; I think you can do that with any people in the world however civilized; Only now many people don't want another war.
- Gotten worse.
- Leaders that prepared the war are gone; war continues by other means; attitudes haven't overcome the fact that no one won the war, so war objectives are still being pursued.
- People's minds are not flexible.
- Regarding attitudes: to feel better about one's actions/history: 1) Don't talk about it, 2) If we hadn't done it, they would have done it to us, 3) By not knowing, they protect themselves.
- Strong human insecurities (class, ethnic) led to the war; There is still a sense of ethnic/human insecurity.
- The opinions that led to the war are still there; Serbs don't see themselves as aggressors; Serbs think "If we don't stop them/kill them, then they will kill us."
- The primary change is that people are more aware of the dangers of escalation.
- The war not generated from inside. The question would be better put this way - the question of attitudes is regional capitols.

- There are serious disagreements about what led to the war. There was no real reconciliation after WWII.
- They have been maintained as a means to keep power; The war did not come from below, it was a forced mass mobilization from political/military/nationalist elite.
- Very little among opinion framers/politicians.
- We have solidarity on dealing with natural disasters (civil emergencies), but not about war. People don't talk about problems outside of their own ethnic group.

30. *To what degree can people of different ethnic groups have empathy towards each other (4.1)?*

- Absolutely, 120%.
- Between common people there is not a problem generally speaking - except when there is a crisis.
- Depends on location/area of conflict.
- Depends on the person, but generally low.
- Finding mutual interest and people can be pragmatic.
- How can youth have empathy when they have no experience of the other. Before the war, 40-60% of marriages in Sarajevo were inter-ethnic, now almost no new marriages are inter-ethnic.
- Moderate but highly variable; War forced everyone to focus on one identity (ethnic) Vs. other comprehensive identities; IC has not given a context for locals to come together-no strategy between two points.
- More over 30 years old than under 30 years old.
- Need outsider facilitation.
- On the basis of personal relationships.
- Only if A. admits and apologizes then B. will (a vicious cycle).
- Politicians have none; People are normal.
- Some people do not want to understand others.
- These are not ethnic but religious groups.
- Very high if they as individuals talk to each other, but if generalized, then there is low empathy.



Total statistical means for each Sector is shown below in parentheses:

**Structural Elements (3.6):**

1. Stable Self-Governance (3.4)
2. Safe & Secure Environment (4.2)
3. Rule of Law (3.5)
4. Sustainable, Legitimate Economy (3.1)
5. Social Well-Being (4.4)

**Relational Elements (3.9):**

1. Trust (3.8)
2. Respect (3.8)
3. Tolerance (3.9)
4. Reconciliation (3.6)
5. Personal Violence (4.9)
6. Normalization of Relations (3.7)
7. Empathy Towards The Other (4.1)

The Grand Total means for **Key Elements of Conflict Transformation** is (3.7):  
(structural + relational elements).

## ANNEX B.

**Sample Comparison of Means for 5 Sub-Set Groups**

This Annex contains a sampling of total mean scores for seven crucial closed-ended survey questions from Bosnian nationals, international interveners, Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. are provided with brief comments (all local nationals were Bosnian residents in Bosnia). My analysis follows.

**Table 1: Sample Comparison of Means for Primary Sub-Set Groups To Closed-Ended Survey Questions**

<b>q1: To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	3.80	1.172
International Intervenors	3.98	1.407
Bosniaks	3.38	.740
Croats	4.38	.916
Bosnian Serbs	4.00	1.710
<b>q5: To what degree is political leadership polarized along ethnic lines?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	6.16	.921
International Intervenors	6.34	.688
Bosniaks	5.95	.759
Croats	6.12	1.126
Bosnian Serbs	6.50	.941
<b>q7: To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	2.62	1.141
International Intervenors	2.94	1.126
Bosniaks	2.43	1.121
Croats	2.63	.916
Bosnian Serbs	2.64	1.151

<b>q17: To what degree is corruption a factor in government?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	5.28	1.036
International Interveners	5.90	.857
Bosniaks	5.26	.806
Croats	5.13	1.126
Bosnian Serbs	5.50	1.019
<b>q19: To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	4.04	1.186
International Interveners	3.65	.956
Bosniaks	3.90	.968
Croats	3.75	1.035
Bosnian Serbs	4.21	1.369
<b>q25: To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	2.75	.917
International Interveners	2.65	.751
Bosniaks	2.60	.940
Croats	2.86	.378
Bosnian Serbs	2.92	.954
<b>q29: To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war?</b>		
<b>Sub-set Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
All Bosnian Nationals	3.45	1.299
International Interveners	3.71	1.132
Bosniaks	3.65	1.226
Croats	3.65	1.226
Bosnian Serbs	3.21	1.251

The means shown in Table 1 reflect the large size of the sub-sets calculated with outlier responses washing out in the averaging. As the sub-set groups are further deconstructed, the dispersion between responses of subjects would be expected to increase; nevertheless, a few preliminary findings can be discerned. Generally, the sub-set groups concur on most issues when asked. However, as explained in the section above on Subject Comments Regarding Their Responses to Closed-Ended

Questions, some subjects added conditional written or verbal comments to a number of their checked responses on the survey. For example, [paraphrasing here] relations are generally OK for now (but inter-ethnic interaction is minimal), but if ultra-nationalist leaders and groups get really active again, then everyone will very quickly fall back into deep hostilities, and serious violence or war will not be far behind.

Regarding **Question 1**, the mean score for Croats (4.38) is the highest score among the five sub-set groups suggesting that Croats have a slightly higher level of confidence that leaders support the peace agreement. Their .916 standard deviation indicates a fairly narrow dispersion from the mean suggesting a greater consensus on the matter than Bosnian Serbs, who had the second highest mean score but much less consensus according to their standard deviation of 1.710. Nevertheless, the score of 4.38 or 4.00 respectively is still only a moderate level of confidence that leaders support the peace agreement.

This modest level of support overall carries implications and perhaps partial explanations as to why there is generally minimal cooperation between official ethno-political groups regarding the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It is not clear from these particular figures alone if the actual lack of support for the peace agreement, on the part of leaders, reflects support or lack of support for the Dayton three "Entity" (mini-state) political arrangement or if there are other significant issues. Greater clarity on this issue is derived from subject written and verbal comments associated with Question 1, which reveal more nuanced information as discussed in the section above on Subject Comments Regarding Their Responses to Closed-Ended Questions.

This point seems to lend credence to the idea that abduction, as a methodological process is useful in terms of allowing for inference-to-the-best-explanation when statistics may not fully capture a phenomenon for various reasons; as conjectured in Chapter 7. To reiterate, subject comments specific to this point were that leaders tend to support those aspects of the peace agreement that benefit their respective ethnic group specifically and tend to ignore or work against the other parts of the agreement.

The standard deviation for Bosniaks (.740) reflects the highest level of consensus (smallest dispersion about the mean) among the sub-set groups concerning Question 1, indicating that they perceive less support, on the part of leaders for the peace agreement. This may reflect the decisive movement of the Bosniak president (of the three member rotating Bosnian presidency) who rather dramatically shifted from a western-favored moderate to an ultra-nationalist stance on political issues, including full implementation Dayton Agreement terms; this occurred only a couple of years before the survey for this study was conducted.

**Question 5** indicates that international interveners perceive the level of polarization, along ethnic lines, among political leaders to be slightly higher than Bosnian Nationals as a whole. Although, Bosnian Serbs, as an individual sub-set group, perceive the polarization to be slightly higher than do internationals or Bosnian Nationals as a whole. The relatively low standard deviations for all sub-set groups indicate a fairly high level of consensus among all groups on this point.

**Question 7:** The 2.94 mean for internationals indicates a slightly higher level of confidence that legitimate institutional capacity outweighs corruption and lawlessness. Do local nationals know something that internationals do not? Or, to turn it around, do internationals see the benefits of future democratization and development more clearly?; assuming all goes well.

Just the same, an important point regarding the “very low” to “low” mean scores for Question 7, is that there is an, essentially, “across-the-board” consensus among all five key sub-set groups that “institutional performance” is a long way from overriding the “drivers of conflict” discussed earlier and therefore reaching the “viable peace” threshold, as shown on the War-to-Sustainable Peace Continuum. Legitimate institutional capacity is a key factor for stable self-governance. This information strongly suggests that there are serious obstacles, in the governance sector, to progress towards viable peace and sustainable positive peace. It further suggests that other factors are preventing an actual status of violent civil disorder at this time, such as the significant international presence in Bosnia with its continued intense on-the-ground guidance and support, and trip-wire function. This factor alone, in my opinion, warrants a continued international presence on the ground, and a search for alternative approaches to dealing with the governance “stalemate.”

Croat Response to **Question 17** suggests that they have slightly more confidence in their political leaders and governance than the other ethnic groups or internationals, that is, by perceiving slightly less corruption in government (5.13 mean score). Internationals, despite having expressed a slightly higher level of confidence in legitimate institutional capacity (Question 7, with a 2.94 mean); perceive the highest (slightly) level of corruption in government (Question 17, with a 5.90 mean). Nevertheless, there is, essentially, a broad consensus among all groups that the degree of corruption as a factor in government is between “high” to “very high.” The “very low” to “low” mean response scores by all sub-set groups for Question 7 (legitimate institutional capacity Vs. corruption and lawlessness, which is, in effect, “legitimate institutional capacity” Vs. “the drivers of conflict”) is not surprising then when corruption is taken into consideration. A “high” to “very high” level of corruption in government corroborates a “weak” “institutional performance” status and, consequently, a “strong” “drivers of conflict” status on the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum.

Concerning **Question 19** and according to the means’ scores, Bosnian Serbs believe there to be a higher level of trust between neighbors of different ethnicities, with the internationals’ lowest mean score suggesting that internationals perceive the lowest level of trust between ethnic groups. A question that might be pursued here in future deeper deconstructed analysis is whether the Bosnian Serb optimism is truly held, or if it is perhaps hoped for as a measure of assurance for maintaining at least a separate Bosnian Serb Entity, if not state at some point in the future – based on support underpinned by trust.

The unanimous “very low” to “low” mean scores for **Question 25** clearly indicate that no one, internationals or Bosnian nationals of any ethnicity, believe that much has been done to make amends for past injuries. Also the standard deviations all indicate a fairly high level of consensus on this, especially Croats. Clearly, this is an issue that is very sensitive for all concerned, and as such, deserves closer examination to determine if it is indeed a significant obstacle to normalization of relations, and by association, normalization of the state.

The “low” to “moderate” mean scores for responses to **Question 29**, suggest that attitudes that led to the war have not changed much since the war. This clearly suggest that there is much work to be done given that, as I have suggested earlier, sentiments that precipitated the war are largely untouched in terms of intervention peacebuilding or conflict transformation, however one wishes to define the terms.

## Responses to survey open-ended questions

The open-ended questions, posed in the Structural & Relational Elements Status Survey are:

- 1) What is the result of intervention by outsiders?
- 2) Why do some conflict resolution or peacebuilding ideas not work?
- 3) How would you improve relations between ethnic groups?
- 4) What other thoughts would you like to share?

The purpose of posing the four open-ended questions was to draw out deeper, more fully elaborated views and explanations pertaining to particular key factors in the intervention as well as to facilitate triangulation to some extent of closed-ended question data. The complete actual responses for Open-Ended Questions 1, 2, and 3 are provided in Appendix A of my dissertation on file at George Mason University.

Responses to Question 4 essentially repeat responses given to the previous three questions, but with some further elaboration on one point or the other, so I do not include Question 4 responses in this Annex.

### Open-Ended Question 1: Comment on Responses

#### *What is the result of intervention by outsiders?*

**Appendix A.** contains the actual **Open-Ended Question 1 responses** in a list format. My comment and observations regarding the responses are below. It becomes fairly apparent that there are definite trends and patterns in the responses, although different words or expressions are used to make essentially the same point. All answers listed below are actual subject responses without paraphrasing or summarizing by me. I have highlighted some answers in bold that have particular relevance to particular points in this study.

A cursory review of the responses to the open-ended questions regarding the result of the intervention reveals that there is a very high level of consensus and appreciation for the intervention having stopped the war. On the other hand, a significant number of qualifications have been made; For example, yes the war was stopped, but it could have and should have been stopped much sooner. Some respondents point out that much has been done to reconstruct BiH, but there is still as much ethnic tension as there was before the intervention. Several point out that the Dayton Peace Accord stopped the war, but is seriously flawed and has resulted in seriously flawed governance and institutions.

I think the responses to open-ended Question 1 capture fairly well the complexities of conditions in BiH and the intervention, and provide some indication of the contrast between success in terms of structural reconstruction, albeit flawed, and relational and tolerance improvement, which has not been successful at all.

## **Open-Ended Question 2: Comment on Responses**

### ***Why do some conflict resolution or peacebuilding ideas not work?***

There is a high degree of consensus regarding the idea of doing something, anything just to stop the war, which the Dayton Accords did, but the process has left many large problems that continue to seriously undermine any real return to a normalized state or normalized relations between ethnic groups.

Two points stand out here: 1) The Dayton Accords peace agreement-based reconstruction has established seriously dysfunctional and discriminatory institutions and governance mechanisms, and 2) The peace agreement, and any conflict resolution or peacebuilding efforts intended to address underlying causes and conditions, and presumably improve relations between the ethnic groups, has been very weak and has essentially failed. This implies two things, first, that the degree to which primary structural elements are flawed is high, if not very high, and as such, (2) constitutes a state of serious structural violence, which is unlikely to be reduced until flaws inherent in the structures are remedied. In essence, the agreement that stopped the war became frozen into a constitution, which perpetuates the structural violence and, therefore, precludes improvement in structural elements, and seriously inhibits improvement in relational areas.

## **Open-Ended Question 3: Comment on Responses**

### ***How do you improve relations between ethnic groups?***

Open-Ended Question 3 elicited the most diverse comments and suggestions making categorization of trends and patterns less straightforward. A dissertation in its own right could be done on responses to Question 3 in regard to peacebuilding and improving relationships, and what can enable or thwart well-intentioned efforts to that effect. It appears that most of the responses can be separated into structural change or direct relational change suggestions or comments, if one wanted to take that approach. Many respondents seemed to understand, directly or intuitively, that there is a connection between structure and relationship. So the challenge is to decide which approach to take or what combination thereof. Although there are some strong views given, it still remains up to the intervenor to decide or consult others on which approach(es) should be attempted.

Based on responses to Question 3, it is apparent that no satisfactory formula has been realized or implemented to date in the BiH intervention to improve relations among ethno-national groups. In fact, the opposite effect seems to be the case, largely due to the innate ethno-political division inherent in the design of institutional and political systems according to the Dayton Accords, albeit, the agreement did facilitate an expedient negotiated political settlement, and thus stopped the war. In other words, Dayton brought negative peace to Bosnia, which is still in effect, with little sign of any meaningful movement toward positive peace.

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